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Are Mem bers of the Hun gar ian Mi nor ity 
in Ro ma nia
Part of the Ro ma nian Po liti cal Com mu nity?
LEVENTE SALAT
The suc ces sive at tempts of the Hun gar ian mi nor ity’s elite to seek in te gra tion 
into the Ro ma nian state, first be tween the two world wars1 and then af ter 1945, un-
der the com mu nist rule2, have lead sub se quently to two equally un fa vor able con-
clu sions: first, that the way in which the lead ers of the com mu nity think about the 
terms of the in te gra tion is in con flict with the in ter ests of the Ro ma nian ma jor ity 
and, per haps, with the rai son d’être of the Ro ma nian state it self; sec ond, that the 
per se ver ance of the Hun gar ian mi nor ity to seek in te gra tion on its own terms gen-
er ated a deep mis trust of the Ro ma nian au thori ties con cern ing the po liti cal ob jec-
tives to the com mu nity. Be tween the two world wars this mis trust be came the 
cen tral ele ment of the Ro ma nian state’s mi nor ity poli cies, sus pect ing edu ca tional 
and cul tural in sti tu tions, churches and youth as so cia tions of sub ver sive ac tiv ity3. 
Fol low ing WWII, es pe cially af ter the 1956 Hun gar ian revo lu tion, the Com mu nist 
au thori ties in Ro ma nia con sid ered that the in ter est of the Hun gar ian mi nor ity in 
sepa rate in sti tu tions is a mat ter of state se cu rity4.
The fail ure of pre vi ous at tempts to pro vide pat terns of in te gra tion ac cept able 
for both the Ro ma nian ma jor ity and the Hun gar ian mi nor ity, to gether with the tra-
di tion of in sti tu tion al ized mis trust of the Ro ma nian au thori ties rep re sented a dif fi-
cult leg acy for the post-1989 po liti cal pro jects and eth nopoli ti cal strate gies. From 
the per spec tive of the pre sent ap proach, the most im por tant changes that oc curred 
af ter 1989, as com pared to the pe riod of the com mu nist rule, was the dis ap pear-
ance of any bar rier in front of as sum ing ”Hun garian ness” in pub lic, and the ac cep-
tance of the idea that the Hun gar ian com mu nity, to gether with other mi nori ties, 
needs po liti cal rep re sen ta tion, on a cor po ra tive ba sis. In the con text of the young 
Ro ma nian de moc racy and the emerg ing multi-party sys tem, the role of rep re sent-
ing Hun gari ans in the coun try’s po liti cal life was as sumed by a rap idly as sem-
bling or gani za tion, the De moc ratic Al li ance of Hun gari ans in Ro ma nia (DAHR) 
1 See in this regard Zsolt K. LENGYEL, Auf der Suche nach dem Kompromiß. Ursprünge und 
Gestalten des frühen Transsilvanismus 1918-1928, Verlag Ungariches Institut, München, 1993; Ferenc 
F. HORVÁTH, Elutasítás és alkalmazkodás között. A romániai magyar kisebbségi elit politikai stratégiái, 
Pro-Print, Miercurea-Ciuc, 2007 and Lucian NASTASĂ, Levente SALAT (ed.), Maghiarii din 
România şi etica minoritară (1920-1940), CRDE, Cluj, 2003. 
2 Vladimir TISMĂNEANU, Dorin DOBRINCU, Cristian VASILE (ed.), Raport Final, Editura 
Humanitas, Bucureşti, 2007, pp. 332-354.
3 Cf. Irina LIVEZEANU, Cultură şi naţionalism în România Mare, 1918-1930, Editura Humanitas, 
Bucureşti, 1998, p. 217.
4 Nándor BÁRDI, ”A romániai magyar elit generációs csoportjainak integrációs viszony-
rendszere”, in Nándor BÁRDI, Attila SIMON (ed.), Integrációs stratégiák a magyar kisebbségek 
történetében, Fórum Kisebbségkutató Intézet, Somorja, 2006, p. 56.
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which found it self in the po si tion to re-launch the at tempts aim ing to find ways of 
ac com mo dat ing Hun gari ans within the struc tures of the Ro ma nian state.  A f  t e r 
18 years of ac tiv ity, DAHR ex hib its a unique and quite para doxi cal ac count: while 
it is the most sta ble po liti cal or gani za tion in the Ro ma nian Par lia ment since the 
first post-1989 elec tions, and is the only po liti cal or gani za tion which has been in 
power (or on the side of the gov ern ment) for the past 11 years, the most im por tant 
ob jec tives of its po liti cal pro gram – the ones re fer ring ex actly to the de sired ways of 
in te gra tion of the Hun gar ian mi nor ity into the struc tures of the Ro ma nian state – 
proved im pos si ble to achieve.
The situa tion of the Hun gar ian mi nor ity in Ro ma nia has im proved sig nifi-
cantly in many con cerns. Be yond wide po liti cal rep re sen ta tion, the com mu nity 
gradu ally earned ex ten sive lan guage rights (in edu ca tion, pub lic ad mini stra tion, 
mass me dia and, to a more lim ited ex tent, in ju ris pru dence) and its mem bers are 
the bene fi ci ar ies of a con sid er able net work of state-funded edu ca tional, cul tural 
and me dia in sti tu tions op er at ing in Hun gar ian lan guage, as well as doz ens of pri-
vate as so cia tions1. In spite of the un de ni able achieve ments, the con flict ing in ter ests 
of the two com mu ni ties could not be rec on ciled, and the op tions of the Ro ma ni ans 
and Hun gari ans, as far as the is sue of the in te gra tion is con cerned, con tinue to dif-
fer in es sen tial terms. The domi nant pat terns of pub lic opin ion yield con flict ing – 
or at least mu tu ally ig no rant – iden tity struc tures and com pet ing eth nopoli ti cal 
strate gies, which raise the in trigu ing ques tion: on what grounds can Hun gari ans in 
Ro ma nia be con sid ered as part of the Ro ma nian po liti cal com mu nity?
I will try to of fer an an swer to this ques tion by com par ing the domi nant trends 
in con cep tu al iz ing the term po liti cal com mu nity with re cent re search re sults bar ing 
the evi dence of the con flict ing iden tity struc tures and com pet ing eth nopoli ti cal 
strate gies which di vide the Ro ma nian po liti cal com mu nity along eth nic fault-lines.
The Con cept of Po liti cal Com mu nity
The con cept of po liti cal com mu nity is sur pris ingly un der theo retized in po liti-
cal sci ence. Seem ingly, there aren’t any com pre hen sive re search pro jects tar get ing 
the dif fer ent his tori cal, theo reti cal and em piri cal as pects of the is sue which do not 
fall back on stud ies dedi cated ei ther to the con cept of the state, or theo reti cal ac-
counts – regu larly an chored in the re pub li can tra di tion – of the term ”na tion”. The 
Hand book of Po liti cal Sci ence mas tered by Goodin and Klinge mann2 does not pro-
vide any defi ni tion of term and more sys tem atic works dedi cated to the con cept 
are gen er ally lack ing, in spite of the fact that the is sue of the ”bounded” or ”in te-
grated” com mu ni ties has been a con cern for au thors like Kant, Hegel, Marx, Max 
We ber, Mar cel Mauss, Carl Schmitt, Han nah Ar endt, Ray mond Aron, Robert A. 
Nis bet and many oth ers3. A more ana lyti cal ac count of the con cept has been of-
1 For details see István HORVÁTH, Facilitating Conflict Transformation. Implementing the 
Recommendations of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities to Romania, 1993-2001, 
INCORE Working Paper no 8, Hamburg, 2002.
2 Robert E. GOODIN, Hans-Dieter KLINGEMANN (eds.), A New Handbook of Political 
Science, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998.
3 Some of the most recent referential works are: Chantal MOUFFE, ”Democratic Citizenship 
and Political Community”, in IDEM (ed.), Dimensions of Radical Democracy. Pluralism, Citizenship, 
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fered re cently by Eliza beth Fra zer, from the per spec tives of the com mu ni tarian po-
liti cal the ory1.
Though the con cept is widely used, its sig nifi cance is con sid ered in most cas-
es as be ing self-ref er en tial. How ever, if we have a closer look to the broad area of 
its sig nifi cance we can eas ily dis cover that the con cept is loaded with sev eral in ter-
nal ten sions, con tra dic tions and am bi gui ties.
Some use the term as equal with the pol ity, and most au thors see a strong re la-
tion ship be tween the state, the so ci ety and the con cept of po liti cal com mu nity. 
”Our domi nant sense of po liti cal com mu nity re mains the na tion-state”, ob served 
Mi chael Sa ward in one of his re cent pa pers2. This in ter pre ta tion fol lows with out 
doubt from Max We ber’s au thori ta tive view, who de fined the par ticu lar type of 
com mu nity (or group) which can be con sid ered ”po liti cal” as one that has a ”ter ri-
to rial ba sis” and is in ter ested in the ”en force ment of its or der”, usu ally through 
the ”mo nop oly of the le giti mate use of physi cal force”. If the claim of a bind ing au-
thor ity over all ac tion tak ing place in the area of its ju ris dic tion trans lates into the 
suc cess fully up held mo nop oly of the le giti mate use of force, the po liti cal com mu-
nity ”will be called a ’state’”, con cluded We ber3.
There are, how ever, opin ions ac cord ing to which well or gan ized, self-gov ern-
ing sub-state ac tors can also be con sid ered po liti cal com mu ni ties4. Oth ers be lieve 
that po liti cal com mu ni ties can be con sti tuted be yond the na tion-state, too, in the 
realm of the in ter-state re la tions, for in stance5. It is il lus tra tive in this re spect that 
af ter the short-lived at tempt, be tween 1952 and 1954, to en act it in Europe’s first 
Con sti tu tion6, the con cept of the ”Euro pean po liti cal com mu nity” has also been in 
use again lately7.
On a dif fer ent level of analy sis, Fra zer ob serves that the term, and its us age, em-
bod ies at least four dif fer ent types of am bi gui ties. The most com mon in ter pre ta tion re-
fers to a par ticu lar type of com mu nity, along other kinds of ”par tial” com mu ni ties 
Comunity, Verso, London, 1992, pp. 225-239; Paul LICHTERMAN, The Search for Political Community, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996; Daniele ARCHIBUGI, David HELD, Martin 
KÖHLER (eds.), Re-Imagining Political Community. Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy, Stanford 
University Presss, Stanford, 1998 and Andrew LINKLATER, The Transformation of Political 
Community, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1998.
1 Elizabeth FRAZER, The Problems of Communitarian Politics. Unity and Conflict, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1999. 
2 Michael SAWARD, ”At the Edge of Political Theory: Political Community and Deliberative 
Democracy”, paper presented at the epsNet plenary conference Political Scientists in the New 
Europe, Paris, 13-14 June 2003, p. 1, emphasis in the original.
3 Max WEBER, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, The Free Press-Collier 
Macmillan Publishers, New York-London, 1964, pp. 154-156. 
4 See for instance, Arthur G. RUBINOFF, The Construction of a Political Community. Integration 
and Identity in Goa, SAGE, London-Thousand Oaks-New Delhi, 1998.
5 The most eloquent example is provided by Karl W. DEUTSCH et al, Political Community 
and the North Atlantic Area, Princeton University Press, Princeton New Jersey, 1957.
6 Richard T. GRIFFITHS, Europe’s First Constitution: The European Political Community, 
1952-1954, Federal Trust for Education and Research, London, 2000.
7 The project of the European Political Community was abandoned after the failure of the 
European Defence Policy, due to the refusal of the French National Assembly to ratify the corre-
sponding Treaty, the idea being reiterated later within the so called ”cohesion policy” of the EU. 
See in this regard Sonia MAZEY, ”The Development of the European Idea: From Sectoral 
Integration to Political Union”, in Jeremy RICHARDSON, European Union: Power and Policymaking, 
Routledge, London-New York, 1996. 
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like, eth nic, lo cal or busi ness com mu ni ties, in which what is shared is po liti cal: in sti-
tu tions, val ues, etc. A sec ond wide spread ac count of the con cept con sid ers that po-
liti cal com mu nity is a com mu nity which is or gan ized po liti cally. Ac cord ing to this 
view, the po liti cal tie is added to other, prior com mon al ities like cul ture, econ omy 
and shared ter ri tory. A third sense of the term re fers to the be lief that a com mu nity 
can be con sid ered to be a po liti cal com mu nity if it acts po liti cally and be haves as a 
po liti cal ac tor, by de fend ing the com mu ni ties con tin ued ex is tence, pro tect ing the 
mem bers’ needs and bene fits, norms, in sti tu tions and tra di tions. The fourth in ter pre-
ta tion holds that the dis tinc tive fea ture of the po liti cal com mu nity is that it is con sti-
tuted po liti cally; this view re flects the rec og ni tion that in a his tori cal per spec tive the 
rea sons of the dis in te gra tion of com mu ni ties are usu ally po liti cal1. Fra zer ob serves 
that po liti cal the ory is highly am bigu ous par ticu larly as far as the first two con no ta-
tions are con cerned: while many au thors con sider that po liti cal ties are thin ner and 
over look other types of al le giances, it is at least as wide spread the be lief that a genu-
ine po liti cal com mu nity needs deep forms of com mit ment, re cip roc ity, shared cul-
ture and com mon mean ings at tached to vari ous as pects of com mu nal life.
Two fur ther apects of the is sue are of in ter est for Fra zer: the way in which a 
po liti cal com mu nity comes into be ing and the level of in ter nal con flict and di ver-
sity which with holds the com mu nity from dis in te gra tion.
 As far as the first as pect is con cerned, Fra zer notes that po liti cal com mu ni ties 
can be con sti tuted both exo ge nously and endoge nously. The en doge nous ver sion 
im plies cases in which a ”so cial con tract” trans forms an ag gre ga tion of in di vidu als 
into a ”duly con sti tuted po liti cal as so cia tion (or so ci ety, or pol ity – or com mu nity) 
with agreed pro ce dures for leg is la tion, ad ju di cia tion, and ad mini stra tion and an 
agreed lo cus of and dis tri bu tion of sov er eign power”2. How ever, a more ”re al is tic” 
ac count of ”bring ing into be ing a po liti cal com mu nity” seems to be the fol low ing:
”A po liti cal set tle ment is forged – by vio lent con quest, by the grad ual 
cen trali za tion of power and the ac crual of le giti macy, by the dis pos ses sion of 
kings in the fa vour of the com mons – a po liti cal com mu nity, in the pre sent 
sense, might be said to be the up shot at the point when in di vidu als share al-
le giance to a par ticu lar set of in sti tu tions and pro ce dures”3.
Fra zer ob serves that the ac crual of le giti macy pre sup poses ”sto ries, ac tions 
and ori en ta tions which tend to con firm its [the com mu nity’s] ex is tence”4, as well 
as a group of per sons who un der take to pro vide the rules and their jus ti fi ca tion. It 
is quite com mon that the group which as sumes this role acts in its own in ter est:
”The in sti tu tion of poli tics, as has been ob served, is quite con sis tent 
with a po liti cally domi nant class or group prom ul gat ing and pro mot ing 
mythi cal jus ti fi ca tion of the so cial or der, or ar gu ments in fa vour of tra di-
tional pat terns of gov ern ment […] – in their own in ter est”5.
The ex is tence of a group which de fines the po liti cal com mu nity ac cord ing to 
its own in ter ests has fur ther con se quences in Fra zer’s view: the ex clu sion of those 
1 Elizabeth FRAZER, The Problems of…cit, pp. 218-219.
2 Ibidem, p. 220.
3 Ibidem.
4 Ibidem, p. 221.
5 Ibidem, p. 236.
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who can not ac cept the pre vail ing trend of jus ti fi ca tion for the com mu nity’s ex is-
tence. For the sake of sta bil ity and ef fi ciency, the dis cur sive space of the po liti cal 
com mu nity has to be de fined in such a way that the voices of the ex cluded can-
not be heard.
”The rules of the po liti cal game and the rules of con duct that gov ern 
par tici pa tion in it, has been con structed so as to bene fit those who con-
structed the po liti cal sphere and con tinue to par tici pate in it, and so as to ex-
clude per sons whose dis ad van tage and sub or di na tion is nec es sary […] At 
the same time, the claims of the dis ad van taged can not be pressed or heard in 
the nor mal po liti cal proc ess which is or gan ized so as to ex clude cer tain kinds 
of voices, cer tain kinds of claims, and cer tain agenda items”1.
The is sue of ex clu sion from the po liti cal com mu nity has deep roots in the his-
tory of po liti cal thought and is closely con nected to the as sump tion ac cord ing to 
which the good po liti cal com mu nity is ho mo ge ne ous from a cer tain point of view 
– which quite of ten equals with lin guis tic, re li gious and cul tural ho mo ge ne ity but 
can take other forms, as well –, ei ther as a pre-ex ist ing con di tion, or an out come of 
the con tin ued and suc cess ful ex is tence of the com mu nity. This tacit and rarely ver-
bal ized con vic tion stems most proba bly from the prac ti cal ad van tage rep re sented 
by a com mu nity con sti tuted of peo ple who feel and think alike, share the same 
way of life, pray to the same God and speak one com mon lan guage. Within such a 
com mu nity the main func tions of poli tics are eas ier to per form: the com mon good 
can be de fined with less dif fi culty, con sent be tween the rul ers and the ruled is 
more prob able and eas ier to be re in forced time and again.
In spite of that, the is sue of the po liti cal com mu ni ties tac itly re quired – and 
quite of ten bru tally pur sued – ho mo ge ne ity is largely un der re searched in po liti cal 
sci ence. Though nei ther Mi chael Mann, nor Charles Tilly pays more sys tem atic at-
ten tion to the is sue, in my view both Mann’s ac count on the so cial sources of pow-
er2 and Tilly’s analy sis on the con struc tion and de con struc tion of states3 bare 
im por tant con se quences in this re spect. In Mann’s case, his broad his tori cal analy-
sis re gard ing the de vel op ment of hu man ca pac ity to or gan ize and con trol popu la-
tions and ter ri to ries in cludes sev eral il lus tra tive ex am ples of the quest for 
ho mo ge ne ity, and the dif fer ent types of power he con cen trates on – ideo logi cal, 
eco nomic, mili tary and po liti cal – all play an im por tant ho moge niz ing role in the 
proc ess of or ga niz ing the con trol of a cer tain ter ri tory, be yond the em pha sis laid 
by Mann on the ”over lap ping, in ter sect ing, net work”-type na ture of power re la-
tions which ”pro duce un an tici pated, emer gent con se quences”4, in stead of be ing 
sepa rate di men sions of a ”sin gle so cial to tal ity”5. In Tilly’s case, his core con cept of 
”co er cion” bares a lot of im plicit rele vance as well to the proc ess of ho mog eni za-
tion. In ad di tion to that he ex plic itly ad mits at one point that
1 Ibidem, p. 234
2 Michael MANN, The Sources of Social Power, vol. I. A History of Power from the Beginning to 
A.D. 1760, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986 and The Sources of Social Power, vol. II. 
The Rise of Classes and Nation-states, 1760-1914, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993.
3 Charles TILLY, Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990-1992, Blackwell, Cambridge 
MA-Oxford UK, 1992.
4 Michael MANN, The Sources of…cit, 1993, pp. 9-10.
5 IDEM, The Sources of…cit, 1986, p. 2. 
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”In one of their more self-con scious at tempts to en gi neer state power, 
rul ers fre quently sought to ho moge nize their popu la tion in the course of in-
stall ing di rect rule. From a ruler’s point of view, a lin guis ti cally, re lig iously, 
and ideo logi cally ho mo ge ne ous popu la tion pre sented the risk of a com mon 
front against royal de mands; ho mog eni za tion made a pol icy of di vide and 
and rule more costly. But ho mo ge ne ity had many com pen sat ing ad van tages: 
within ho mo ge ne ous popu la tion, or di nary peo ple were more likely to iden-
tify with their rul ers, com mu ni ca tion could run more ef fi ciently, and an ad-
min is tra tive in no va tion that worked in one seg ment was likely to work 
else where as well. Peo ple who sensed a com mon ori gin, fur ther more, were 
more likely to unite against ex ter nal threats. Spain, France, and other large 
states re cur rently ho moge nized by giv ing re li gious mi nori ties – es pe cially 
Mus lims and Jews – the choice be tween con ver sion and emi gra tion”1.
In spite of that, the quest for ho mo ge ne ity is not util ized ei ther by Mann, or 
by Tilly as an ex plana tory vari able with a cen tral role in their the ory2.
The cri te rion of ho mo ge ne ity within sta ble col lec tive iden ti ties as frame-
works within which ef fec tive po liti cal rule could be re in forced has changed evi-
dently sev eral times dur ing the course of his tory. In the his tory of po liti cal thought 
it was Ar is totle, most likely, whose nor ma tive rec om men da tions con cern ing the 
ad van tages of the ho mo ge ne ity re mained re corded for the first time. Talk ing 
about the dan gers that may jeop ard ize the sta bil ity of the colo nies he warns, in the 
5th book of his Poli tics that ac cept ing strang ers, on a col lec tive ba sis, into the po liti-
cal com mu nity may un der mine the sta bil ity and it can also lead to de cay:
”An other cause of revo lu tion is dif fer ence of races which do not at once 
ac quire a com mon spirit; for a state is not the growth of a day, any more than 
it grows out of a mul ti tude brought to gether by ac ci dent. Hence the re cep-
tion of strang ers in colo nies, ei ther at the time of their foun da tion or af ter-
wards, has gen er ally pro duced revo lu tion; for ex am ple, the Achaeans who 
joined the Troezeni ans in the foun da tion of Syba ris, be com ing later the more 
nu mer ous, ex pelled them; hence the curse fell upon Syba ris. At Thurii the 
Syba rites quar relled with their fel low-colo nists; think ing that the land be-
longed to them, they wanted too much of it and were driven out. At Byzan-
tium the new colo nists were de tected in a con spir acy, and were ex pelled by 
force of arms; the peo ple of An tissa, who has re ceived the Chian ex iles, 
fought with them, and drove them out; and the Zan cleans, af ter hav ing re-
ceived the Samians, were driven by them out of their own city. The citi zens 
of Apol lonia on the Eux ine, af ter the in tro duc tion of a fresh body of colo-
nists, had a revo lu tion; the Syra cu sans, af ter the ex pul sion of their ty rants, 
hav ing ad mit ted strang ers and mer ce nar ies to the rights of citi zen ship, quar-
relled and came to blows; the peo ple of Am phipo lis, hav ing re ceived Chal-
cidian colo nists, were nearly all ex pelled by them”3.
1 Charles TILLY, Coercion…cit, pp. 106-107.
2 As we shall see later, the conclusions regarding the inherent homogenizing consequences of 
the centralization of political power will be assumed by Mann more overtly in his later work on 
ethnic cleansing, in The Dark Side of Democracy. Explaining Ethnic Cleansing, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2005.
3 ARISTOTLE, Politics, Book V, in Mortimer J. ADLER (ed.), Great Books of the Western World, 
vol. 8, Encyclopaedia Britannica, London, 1994, pp. 504-505. For the correct interpretation of the 
quote it is important to mention, however, that the colonies Aristotle is talking about are artificially 
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In deed, the early forms of the ter ri to rial-po liti cal citi zen ship char ac ter is tic to 
the an cient Greeks pre served its tra di tional, con san guin eal, kin ship-based and 
tribal fea tures even af ter the far reach ing re forms of Kleis the nes: the 139 demes of At-
tica which re sulted from the re forms, even if they were meant to rep re sent the tran-
si tion from the tra di tional eth nic soli dar ity to a new, ter ri to rial kind of soli dar ity 
based on neighbor hood, the im por tance of what had been shared in the tribal and 
con san gui nal ties did not dis ap pear, and con tin ued also in new, shared re li gious 
cults. Though, as Ar is totle notes, Kleis the nes ”dis trib uted Ath ens into ten tribes, in-
stead of the pre vi ous four, with the ob ject of mix ing them up so that more might 
share the rights of citi zen” – and Kleis the nes ac cepted, in deed, for eign ers into the 
deme –, the walls of eth nic and tribal bounda ries that di vided the early forms of po-
liti cal com mu ni ties were ef fec tively pulled down only in the Hel le nis tic world, 
which dis cov ered the broader phi loso phic con cept of hu man ity and kos mopo lis1.
In the early be gin nings of the roughly five cen tu ries of Ro man citi zen ship, 
dur ing the time of ar chaic Rome or gan ized in three tribes and thirty cu riae, the po-
liti cal com mu nity was based, as well, in es sence on com mon de scent and blood re-
la tions, which pro vided the main con tent soli dar ity. The im por tance of the tribal 
re la tions started to di min ish with the fifth cen tury B.C., giv ing place to a new so-
cial di vi son be tween the plebs and patres, as so ci ated with the emer gence of new sac-
ral cults and new in sti tu tions which pro vided the frame works and con tent for a 
dif fer ent type of in te gra tion of the com mu nity. As Gross notes:
”So cial di vi sons called, how ever, for a gen eral in sti tu tion and bond that 
could in te grate the en tire na tion and cor re spond to fun da men tal po liti cal soli dar-
ity: the soli dar ity of all mem bers of the city-state of all of Rome ver sus the out-
side world which was con sid ered for eign and largely hos tile. Also an in sti tu tion 
was needed that would mo bi lize the en tire com mu nity in times of vari ous emer-
gen cies, that would more over sup ply le giti macy of po liti cal power and va lid ity 
of the law. The evolv ing in sti tu tion of citi zen ship rep re sented such a bond”2.
The in sti tu tion of Ro man citi zen ship was lim ited in the be gin ning, as in the 
case of the an cient Greeks, to the mem bers of a sin gle city-state, and has been ex-
tended gradu ally to once for eign, even hos tile peopes. By the end of the re pub lic, 
citi zen ship was ex tended to all It aly, and about 212 A.D., due to Con sti tu tio An to-
niana the in sti tu tion of citi zen ship in cluded all free per sons of the Ro man Em pire, 
ac cord ing to the prin ci ple: civi tatem om ni bus datam.
The in sti tu tion of citi zen ship is one of the re mark able out comes of the gen ius 
of the Ro man ju ris pru dence which man aged to de tach the con cept of po liti cal com-
mu nity from the origi nal con san guin eal and tribal bonds. As Gross puts it:
”The po liti cal bond and im pe rial iden tity were sepa rated defi nitely 
from the con san guin eal-tribal and de tached from eth nic ity, even re lig ion. 
Ro mans were all peo ple, not only from the Ro man urbs, born in the Ro man 
clans and tribes, but sim ply men who were free in habi tants of the em pire”3.
created, insular political communities, lacking the advantages of human settlements emerging 
from more organic evolution.
1 See in this regard Feliks GROSS, Citizenship and Ethnicity. The Growth and Development of a 
Democratic Multiethnic Institution, Greenwood Press, Westport, Cooencticut-London, 1999, pp. 19-28. 
2 Ibidem, p. 33.
3 Ibidem, p. 38. Italics in the original.
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It is im por tant to note, how ever, that the ex pan sion of citi zen ship did not 
erase the im por tance of kin ship and other types of pri mor dial bonds be tween peo-
ple: it just suc ceeded to ef fi ciently sepa rate le gal and po liti cal in sti tu tions from pri-
mor dial – con san guin eal, tribal and sac ral – types of bonds by in te grat ing dif fer ent 
peo ples with vari ous eth nic, lin guis tic and re li gious iden ti ties into the em pire. 
The scope of ex tend ing citi zen ship to peo ples who spoke dif fer ent lan guages and 
wor shipped dif fer ent gods was in fact ex pand ing and in te grat ing the em pire, 
while se cur ing its in ter nal co her ence. Gross ad mits him self, echo ing Sher-
win-White’s opin ion1, that the in sti tu tion of Ro man citi zen ship was in ef fect an in-
stru ment of ”po liti cal as simi la tion of aliens” into a ”new iden tity, a broader 
so cial-po liti cal bond” which be came the ba sis of the new type of same ness and ho-
mo ge ne ity within the Ro man world2. In deed, Cicero, in his De re pub lica, ex plor ing 
the bases of the ideal state de fines the po liti cal com mu nity as a gath er ing of peo-
ple united by the con sen sus re gard ing the com mon good and the unity of in ter-
est3. But the in te gra tion which sepa rated the new forms of soli dar ity from 
pri mor dial iden ti ties did not over write the lat ter. Gross quotes the same Cicero 
elabo rat ing in his De Legibus on an in ter est ing con se quence of Ro man citi zen ship: 
Ro man citi zens regu larly ”have two fa ther lands, one which is given by na ture, the 
other the civic one of the state”4. The sepa ra tion of soli dar ity from iden tity didn’t 
go smooth ei ther: Taci tus men tions in his An nales a de bate in the Sen ate, dur ing 
the time of the con su late of Au lus Vitel lius and Lucius Vip sta nus, when for eign 
borne can di dates to the Sen ate were con tested on the ground that they do not rep-
re sent the tra di tional Ro man vir tue and mor als5.
Dur ing the Mid dle Ages, un der the in flu ence of Ar is totle and the Ro man le-
gal is tic spirit, the vi sions on the state of au thors like Augustine, Saint Tho mas 
Aqui nas or Mar sil ius of Pa dua in cluded the im plicit as sump tion of a cer tain kind 
of ho mo ge ne ity: they all con ceived the state as an or ganic com mu nity of peo ple 
who are united in the pur sue of the com mon good. The me die val con cept of the 
status, from which the mod ern sens of the term ”state” de rived, be gin ning with 
the 13th cen tury re ferred to the fact that cer tain groups of peo ple were united by 
the simi lar ity of hab its and a shared stand ing be fore the law6.
Jean Bodin, in his in flu en tial work on the the ory of sov er eignty, The Six Books 
of the Com mon wealth (1576) sug gests an in ter est ing dis tinc tion be tween the con cept 
of the ”com mon wealth”, which might in cor po rate di ver sity, and that of the ”com-
mune”, which is and must be ho mo ge ne ous in his view:
”The whole body of the citi zens, whether citi zens by birth, by adop tion 
or by en fran chise ment (for these are the three ways in which citi zen rights are 
ac quired) when sub jected to the sin gle sov er eign power of one or more rul ers, 
con sti tutes a com mon wealth, even if there is di ver sity of laws, lan guage, cus-
toms, re lig ion, and race. If all the citi zens are sub ject to a sin gle uni form sys-
tem of laws and cus toms they form not only a com mon wealth but a com mune, 
1 Adrian N. SHERWIN-WHITE, The Roman Citizenship, Oxford University Press, London, 1987.
2 Feliks GROSS, Citizenship and Ethnicity…cit, pp. 38-39.
3 CICERO, Az állam, Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 2007, p. 90 (I. 25).
4 Feliks GROSS, Citizenship and Ethnicity…cit, p. 36.
5 TACITUS, Összes művei, Európai Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 1980, pp. 267-268 (XI. 23)
6 Péter TAKÁCS (ed.), Államelmélet. Az államelmélet, az állambölcselet, és a politikai filozófia vá-
zlata, A Miskolci Egyetem Jogtörténeti és Jogelméleti Intézete, Miskolc, 1997, pp. 20-34.
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even though they be dis persed in di verse town ships, vil lages, or the open 
coun try side. The town is not the com mune, as some have held, any more than 
the house is the house hold, for de pend ants and chil dren can live in widely 
sepa rated places, yet still form a house hold, if they are sub ject to a sin gle head 
of the fam ily. The same ap plies to the com mune. It can con sist of a num ber of 
town ships and vil lages, pro vided they share the same cus toms, as is the case 
with the bailli wicks of this realm. Simi larly the com mon wealth can in clude a 
num ber of com munes and prov inces which all have dif fer ent cus toms. But so 
long as they are sub ject to the au thor ity of a sin gle sov er eign, and the laws 
and or di nances made by it, they con sti tute a com mon wealth”1. 
It is not dif fi cult to dis cover in this dis tinc tion the at tempt to rec on cile the em piri-
cal fact of di ver sity with the claim of ex clu sive, bind ing au thor ity of the sov er eign 
within the given ter ri tory. Bodin also em pha sized the fact that for the sur vival of the 
po liti cal com mu nity the so cial bonds be tween the citi zens and the state (sov er eign) 
should not be ex tended to aliens: po liti cal com mu ni ties en dure as long as they are ex-
clu sive, and es tab lish pe cu liar iden ti ties which dif fer en ti ate them from aliens2.
Jo han nes Al thu sius, in his Poli tics pub lished first in 1603 (and then in two sub-
se quent edi tions) for mu lates ex plicit rec om men da tions re gard ing the way in 
which the good po liti cal com mu nity should be or gan ized and gov erned. For him, 
one of the ba sic func tions of poli tics is the re pro duc tion of the fel low-feel ing 
among the mem bers, through per ma nent com mu ni ca tion that can fa cili tate ”con-
sent and agree ment” in a dis cour sive com mu nity:
”The ef fi cient cause of po liti cal as so cia tion is con sent and agree ment 
among the com mu ni cat ing citi zens. The for mal cause is in deed the as so cia-
tion brought about by con trib ut ing and com mu ni cat ing one with the other, 
in which po liti cal men in sti tute, cul ti vate, main tain and con serve the fel low-
ship of hu man life through de ci sions about those things use ful and nec es-
sary to this so cial life”3.
Pro vided the im por tance he lays on com mu ni ca tion, it is not sur pris ing that 
he men tions, among the du ties of the ruler, the task of uni fy ing the lan guage with-
in the ter ri tory. With out that, he warns, no po liti cal com mu nity can sur vive and 
no com mun ion of rights is pos si ble:
”The third right is the main te nance of a lan guage, and of the same id iom 
of it, in the ter ri tory. The use of speech is truly nec es sary for men in so cial life, 
for with out it no so ci ety can en dure, nor can the com mun ion of right”4.
He also rec om mends, echo ing Ar is totle, that for the sake of sta bil ity it is not 
rec om mended to grant for eign ers with equal po liti cal rights:
”A com mu nity of citi zens dwell ing in the same ur ban area (urbs), and 
con tent with the same com mu ni ca tion and gov ern ment (jus im perii) is called 
a city (civi tas) or, as it were, the unity of citi zens. And they are citi zens of this 
1 Jean BODIN, The Six Books of the Commonwealth, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1955, p. 20.
2 Cf. Andrew LINKLATER, The Transformation of…cit, p. 1.
3 Johannes ALTHUSIUS, Politica. Politics Methodically Set Forth and Illustrated with Sacred and 
Profane Examples (An abridged translation), Liberty Fund, Indianapolis, 1995, p. 24
4 Ibidem, p. 85.
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com mu nity or city who are part ners in it, as dis tin guished from for eign ers 
and aliens who do not en joy the same stand ing within the city’s le gal or der 
(jus civi ta tis)”1.
The is sue of the po liti cal com mu ni ties’ re quired ho mo ge ne ity be came more 
ex plicit in the era of na tion al ism which gradu ally re placed the im pe rial vi sion of 
the pol ity, fol low ing the end of Na po leon’s his tori cal role, with the ideal of soli dar-
ity char ac ter is tic of the na tional com mu nity. This change in vi sion, which strong-
ly marked the whole nine teenth cen tury and re mained re marka bly in flue ntial 
ever since, fur thered the logic un der ly ing the West phalian state sys tem – based on 
the view that the world con sists of clearly de fin able ter ri to rial units, each un der 
the rule of a sov er eign power, ex er cis ing com plete, ex clu sive and unlim ited con-
trol over the space and the peo ple in hab it ing it – in the sense that the ethno-po liti-
cal ar range ment of the world should not be viewed from the per spec tive of 
ter ri tory, but from that of the na tion ex er cis ing con trol over it.
In the his tory of po liti cal thought John Stu art Mill had, among many oth ers, a 
ma jor con tri bu tion to con soli dat ing this sys tem of be lieves. In 1861, in his memo ra ble 
work On Rep re sen ta tive Gov ern ment, while ex plor ing the pre req ui sites of good gov ern-
ment, he reaches the con clu sion that rep re sen ta tive gov ern ment is only pos si ble by
”unit ing all mem bers of the na tion al ity un der the same gov ern ment […] free 
in sti tu tions are next to im pos si ble in a coun try made up of dif fer ent na tion-
ali ties. Among peo ple with out fel low-feel ing, es pe cially if they read and 
speak dif fer ent lan guages, the united pub lic opin ion, nec es sary to the work-
ing of rep re sen ta tive gov ern ment, can not ex ist […] when there are ei ther free 
in sti tu tions, or a de sire for them, in any of the peo ples ar ti fi cially tied to-
gether, the in ter est of the gov ern ment lies in an ex actly op po site di rec tion. It 
is then in ter ested in keep ing up and en ven om ing their an tipa thies; that they 
may be pre vented from coa lesc ing, and it may be en abled to use some of 
them as tools for the en slave ment of oth ers”2.
Mill’s vi sion was strongly con firmed by his tory: his theo reti cal views were 
shortly in cor po rated in the agenda of in ter na tional poli tics or ches tered by Wood-
row Wil son and put into ap pli ca tion sub se quently – though with large im per fec-
tions – in the peace trea ties end ing WWI, then WWII and dur ing the proc ess of 
de colo ni za tion. Mill proved to be right, how ever, con cern ing his sec ond warn ing, 
too. In 1969, while evalu at ing the per form ances of the young post-co lo nial Af ri can 
states, M.G. Smith con cluded:
”Cul tural di ver sity or plu ral ism auto mati cally im poses the struc tural 
ne ces sity for domi na tion by one of the cul tural sec tions […] many of the 
newly in de pend ent states ei ther disolve into sepa rate cul tural sec tions, or 
main tain their iden tity, but only un der con di tions of domi na tion and sub or-
di na tion in the re la tion ships be tween groups”3.
1 Ibidem, p. 42.
2 John Stuart MILL, ”Considerations on Representative Government”, in IDEM, On Liberty 
and Other Essays, Oxford University Press, Oxford-New York, 1998, p. 428 and 430.
3 Leo KUPER, Michael G. SMITH (eds.), Pluralism in Africa, University of California Press, 
Berkeley, 1969. Quoted by Arend LIJPHART, Democracy in Plural Societies. A Comparative 
Exploration, Yale University Press, New Haven-London, 1977, pp. 18-19.
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Re turn ing to the his tory of po liti cal thought, an in ter est ing proof of the im-
plicit as sump tion con cern ing the po liti cal com mu nity’s ho mo ge ne ity is pro vided 
by the the ory on citi zen ship of T.H. Mar shall1, which talks about three main di-
men sions of the con cept: the civic com po nent of citi zen ship (im ply ing equal ity be-
fore law), the po liti cal com po nent (refer ing to the right to par tici pate in the po liti cal 
life of the com mu nity) and the so cial as pect of citi zen ship (im ply ing the right to eq-
ui ta ble stan dards of liv ing). Ac cord ing to Mar shall, the three com po nents evolved 
gradu ally as sub se quent phases of the eman ci pa tion of (Brit ish) citi zens. The lack 
of a cul tural com po nent in the struc ture of citi zen ship pro posed by the so far most 
in flu en tial the ory on citi zen ship is an in ter est ing proof of the tacit as sump tion re-
gard ing the eth nocul tural ho mo ge ne ity of po liti cal com mu nity.
In a more re cent ac count, Do mi nique Schnap per, in ter ested in the ”poli tics of 
so cial bonds”, of fers an in ter est ing in sight into the in trigu ing is sue of ho mo ge ne-
ity2. Build ing on Hume, Max We ber, Mar cel Mauss and Ray mond Aron, she ac-
knowl edges as a fact that from Ar is totle to John Stu art Mill the ho mo ge ne ity of 
popu la tions has been con sid ered a nec es sary con di tion for the sta bil ity of the po liti-
cal units. She re calls that the com mon al ity of lan guage within peo ple gath ered into 
a ”po liti cal body” has been con sid ered es sen tial for the suc cess of the com mu nity 
also by Hume, and with ref er ence to the ad van tages of the co in ci dence be tween the 
cul tural com mu nity and po liti cal com mu nity she quotes Mauss3 and Aron4.
Giv ing the de served cred its to these stances, Schnap per ob serves nev er the-
less that cul tural ho mo ge ne ity can not be con sid ered a suf fi cient con di tion for ”con-
sti tut ing a na tion”, and, on the re verse, in stances are known in which cul tural 
di ver sity did not make im pos si ble the ar ticu la tion of a ”na tion”. In her view, the 
nec es sary con di tion for vari ous eth nic at tach ments to be com pati ble with a com-
mon po liti cal loy alty is that citi zens share an agree ment with re gard to the jus ti-
fied ex is tence of an ”in de pend ent po liti cal do main of par ticu lar in ter ests”, to gether 
with a re spect for its in ter nal rules of func tion ing5. It fol lows from here that ac cord-
ing to Schnap per the in te gra tive ca pac ity of a po liti cal com mu nity de pends es sen-
tially on the ”po liti cal pro ject” which un der takes to pro vide con tent and le giti macy 
for the ”so cial bonds”:
”Les in sti tu tions de l’État, si elles por tent un pro jet politique et for ment – 
ou sont portées par – une so ciété politique et non plus seule ment par une 
1 Thomas H. MARSHALL, Class, Citizenship and Social Development, Greenwood Press, 
Westport, Connecticut, 1973. 
2 Dominique SCHNAPPER, La communauté des citoyens. Sur l’idée moderne de nation, Éditions 
Gallimard, Paris, 1994.
3 ”Une nation complète est une société integrée suffisament, à pouvoir central démocra-
tique à quelque degré, ayant en tout cas la notion de souveraineté nationale et dont, en général, 
les frontières sont celles d’une race, d’une civilization, d’une langue, d’une morale, en un mot 
d’un caractère national […] Dans les nations achevées tout ceci coïncide.” Marcel MAUSS, 
Œuvres, t. 3, Cohésion sociale et divisions de la sociologie, Éditions de Minuit, Paris, 1969, p. 604. Apud 
Dominique SCHNAPPER, La communauté… cit, p. 42.
4 ”La nation, en tant que type-idéal d’unité politique, a une triple caracteristique: la partici-
pation de tous les gouvernés à l’État sous la double forme de la conscription et du suffrage univer-
sel, la coincidence de ce vouloir politique et d’une communauté de culture, la totale indépendance 
de l’État national vers l’extérieur.” Raymond ARON, Paix et guerre entre les nations, Calmann-Lévy, 
Paris, 1962, p. 297. Apud Dominique SCHNAPPER, La communauté… cit, p. 42.
5 Ibidem, p. 44.
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eth nie par ticu lière, sont sus cep ti bles de sur mon ter les dif férences cul turelles 
et éven tuell ment – plus dif fi cile ment – iden ti taires en tre les groupes. 
L’existence des na tions dé pend de la ca pacité du pro jet politique à résoudre 
les ri vali tés et les con flits en tre groupes so ci aux, re ligieux, ré gionaux ou éth-
niques selon les règles re con nues comme lé gitimes”1.
Schnap per also ob serves and frankly ad mits that when such a po liti cal pro ject 
is suc cess ful, cul tural par ticu lari ties regu larly be come less sa li ent, and even if the 
proc ess of po liti cal or gani za tion does not lead nec es sar ily to the ”cul tural geno-
cide of the pre-ex ist ing iden ti ties”, the State’s in ter ven tion regu larly fa vors egali-
tari an ism at the cost of mar gin al iz ing the logic of iden tity poli tics. In a his tori cal 
per spec tive, she also adds that:
”Les na tions sta bles, peu nom breuses, qui ont été fondées à par tir de 
popu la tions hétérogènes, étaient tou jours le pro duit d’une his toire mul tisé-
cu laire, au cours de laquelle les mem bres de chacun des groupes avaient non 
seul ment intéri orisé l’obligation de re specter les autres, mais aussi lente ment 
élaboré les in sti tu tions politiques qui per pétuaient ob jec tive ment ce re spect 
ré cipro que”2.
Fur ther note wor thy ar gu ments are be ing of fered by Mann in his re cent im-
pres sive work, The Dark Side of De moc racy. Build ing on his pre vi ous in ves ti ga tions 
con cern ing the so cial sources of po liti cal power, he con cludes:
”Po liti cal power is in her ently ter ri to rial, au thori ta tive, and mo nopo lis-
tic. Ide ol ogy is par tially pri vate and sub stan tially vol un tary, eco nomic life 
in volves mar ket choices, and mili tary power is nor maly in sti tu tion al ized 
and kept away from our eve ry day life ex peri ences. But we must sub mit rou-
tinely to regu la tions by a state, and we can not choose which one – ex cept by 
stay ing or leav ing. Ri val claims to sov er eig nity are the most dif fi cult to com-
pro mise and the most likely to lead to mur der ous clean sing. Mur der ous 
clean sing is most likely to re sult where pow er ful groups within two eth nic 
groups aim at le giti mate and achiev able ri val states ’in the name of the peo-
ple’ over the same ter ri tory…”3.
In a his tori cal per spec tive, adds Mann, it can be ob served that
”mur der ous clean sing has been mov ing across the world as it has mod ern-
ized and de moc ra tized. Its past lay mainly among Euro pe ans, who in vented 
the de moc ratic na tion-state. The coun tries in hab ited by Euro pe ans are now 
safely de moc ratic, but most have also been eth ni cally cleansed […] Now the 
epi cen ter of clean sing has moved into the South of the world. Unless hu man-
ity takes eva sive ac tion, it will con tinue to spread un til de moc ra cies – hope-
fully, not eth ni cally cleansed ones – rule the world. Then it will ease”4.
Based on the above we can con clude that though rarely overtly as sumed, the 
tacit as sump tion ac cord ing to which the good po liti cal com mu nity is ho mo ge ne ous 
1 Ibidem, p. 140.
2 Ibidem, p. 141.
3 Michael MANN, The Dark Side of Democracy. Explaining Ethnic Cleansing, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2005, p. 33.
4 Ibidem, pp. 4-5.
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from cer tain point of view – the eth nic, lin guis tic, le gal and re li gious di men sion of 
the same ness be ing regu larly the most con ven ient mark ers – has played an im por-
tant role in the his tory of po liti cal thought and ac tion, and has of ten jus ti fied at-
tempts to achieve the ideal of ho mo ge ne ity through vari ous ac tions from suc cess ful 
in te gra tion, ex pul sion and forci ble as simi la tion to mur der ous eth nic clean sing.
Sev eral re cent re ports and analy ses of fer fur ther ex am ples of how po liti cal 
com mu ni ties try to forge unity by the means of ex clu sion. An ECMI re port on the 
Javak heti Ar me ni ans in Geor gia de scribes for in stance the proc ess through which 
the Geor gian Gov ern ment’s at tempts to cre ate ”na tional unity” by hard line 
monolan guage poli cies, by chang ing the demo graphic bal ance in the ter ri tory, re-
fusal of any form of auton omy claims. Ac cord ing to the re port, the meas ures taken 
by the gov ern ment run the risk of be ing coun ter pro duc tive, since they un der mine 
the trust of Javak hetians in the Geor gian state and push them to seek other forms 
of in te gra tion, or even to con sider go ing vio lent1.
Ilkka Lii kanen and Joni Virk kunen’s pa per on the dy nam ics of the cur rently 
on go ing at tempts of iden tity con struc tion in Es to nia – which is, ac cord ing to the 
au thors, ”a po liti cal proc ess con nected to the con sti tu tion of new po liti cal are nas 
and ideo logi cal bat tle for he gem ony on these are nas” – states the fol low ing:
„Con tem po rary Es to nian leg is la tion is based on the gen er ally rec og-
nised prin ci ple of de moc racy. The Con sti tu tion se cures equal hu man and 
civil rights, as well as con sti tutes the le gal frame work of the Es to nian po liti-
cal sys tem. Si mul ta ne ously, Es to nia has en tered the post-mod ern spaces of 
global eco nom ics, World Wide Web and me dia. Peo ple have an ac cess to a 
wide range of in for ma tion that pro motes pos si bili ties of the counter-hege-
monic popu lar poli tics. It can, how ever, be ar gued that the de moc ratic ideal 
does not fully re flect the con tem po rary so cial and po liti cal re ali ties. Es to nia 
has ’na tion al ised’ (Brubaker) its ter ri tory and claimed the mo nop oly of power. 
This has ’othered’ one sec tion of the non-Es to nian popu la tion, as well as 
trans formed the con cept of de moc racy and po liti cal sys tem to dis cus sions of 
in ter-eth nic re la tions, so cial sta bil ity and bor der con struc tion”2.
A par ticu larly rele vant ex am ple is of fered by an analy sis con cern ing Iran’s po-
liti cal com mu nity fol low ing the 1970-1982 pe riod, dur ing which a group of 
Khomeini’s fol low ers, the cir cle of ”in sid ers” (khudi-ha), seized power by ex clud-
ing their ri vals from the po liti cal field and has mo nopo lized ever since all ma jor 
po liti cal po si tions in the coun try3. The uni fy ing ide ol ogy was pro vided by 
1 Hedvig LOHM, ”Javakheti after the Rose Revolution: Progress and Regress in the Pursuit 
of National Unity in Georgia”, in ECMI Working Paper nr. 38, Flensburg, April 2007. The report in-
cludes the following quote from an interview: ”You know, we didn’t arrive here recently; we 
were here before independence was declared in 1918, and this is our homeland, our state. When 
the referendum was held in 1991 people here voted for the old Constitution from 1921 that stat-
ed that we had the right to use our language in the region. And what do we get now? It would 
have been better if we had fought, like South Ossetia, they are now being offered extensive au-
tonomy solutions while we get nothing”. (Hedvig LOHM, ”Javakheti after the Rose Revolution 
…cit.”, p. 35.)
2 Ilkka LIIKANEN, Joni VIRKKUNEN, Reflections on the Political Construction of Identity in 
Estonia. http://www.indepsocres.spb.ru/virkun_e.htm (May, 19, 2008)
3 Yadullah SHAHIBZADEH, Kjetil SELVIK, ”Iran’s Political Community”, Gulf Studies, no. 7, 
2007, University of Oslo, Department of Culture Studies and Oriental Languages. http://www.hf.
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Khomeini’s doc trine of ve layat-e faqih, based on the con cep tion of the strong po liti-
cal leader act ing in a ”mythi cal unity” with the peo ple. The doc trine of ve layat-e 
faqih be came the core of the Ira nian Con sti tu tion, and as such the ”rule of the 
game”, the mem bers of the po liti cal com mu nity con sid er ing the op po nents of the 
ve layat-e faqih as their ene mies. This ide ol ogy – in par al lel with Ali Shariati’s in flu-
en tial view ac cord ing to which ”a com mu nity (om mat) is a so ci ety of hu man in di vidu-
als who share the same thoughts, be liefs, re lig ion and pus rue the same goal”1 – pro vided 
the ba sis for gradu ally ex clud ing from the po liti cal proc ess and oust ing all the po-
liti cal ac tors which were con sid ered as ”out sid ers”. Af ter sev eral sub se quent 
waves of ex clu sion, the po liti cal com mu nity reached its ”de ci sive shape” in 1981 
with the oust ing of Bani Sadr. The sig nifi cance of the proc ess is re flected in the fol-
low ing way in the Sha hib zadeh-Selvik analy sis:
„The proc ess of ex clu sion also made clear what would be the cri te ria of 
in clu sion in the po liti cal com mu nity. Ac cord ing to the com mu nity’s per cep-
tion of it self, it was the com mu nity of fol low ers of the ve layat-e faqih. These 
fol low ers were in 1981 at war with ex ter nal and in ter nal ’ene mies’. Ex ter-
nally, they were fight ing the Iraqi in va sion and, in ter nally, op po si tion groups 
through out Iran. To wage this bat tle, they used in sti tu tions like the Basij-mi-
li tia, the revo lu tion ary com mit ties (ko miteha-ye en qe lab), the Is lamic Coun cils 
(shuraha-ye eslami), and the Revo lu tion ary Guard (sepah-e pas da ran). Op po-
nents of the ve layat-e faqih would not be ad mit ted to these or gani za tions. 
Thus, the mem bers of the po liti cal com mu nity could eas ily iden tify each 
other and tie per sonal bonds. For ex am ple, if a mem ber of the Revo lu tion ary 
Guard from the city of Shi raz ran into a mem ber of the Teach ers’ Is lamic 
Coun cil of Mash had, they could rec og nize each other from their be hav iour, 
ap pearence and af filia tion. In tui tively, they would feel like be long ing to the 
’same fam ily’. The com mon iden tity and shared ex peri ences gave the po liti-
cal com mu nity a strong co he sion which de fended it from de sta bi liz ing ef-
fects of in ter nal dis putes”2.
The is sue of the costs and con di tions of na tional in te gra tion is also ad dressed 
in Ar thur Rubinoff’s al ready men tioned case study dedi cated to the prov ince of 
Goa, In dia.
Re turn ing to Fra ser’s analy sis, her ac count of fers fur ther in ter est ing in sights 
into the po liti cal com mu nity’s re la tion ship with di ver sity, as well as to the ac cept-
able level of in ter nal con flict which a co her ent po liti cal com mu nity can af ford to 
tol er ate with out jeop ard iz ing its sta bil ity. Though Fra zer seeks, through out the 
whole book, to keep the bal ance be tween the em pa thy re quired by proper com pre-
hen sion and the un en gaged cri tique of the com mu ni tarian views, she seems to 
reach the con clu sion that the es sence of the po liti cal com mu nity can be grasped 
only from the per spec tive of the com mu ni tarian po liti cal phi loso phy. Ac knowl-
edg ing the mer its of what we might call the ”thin” in ter pre ta tion of the term, ac-
cord ing to which one can speak of a po liti cal com mu nity when ever a group of 
peo ple is po liti cally con sti tuted through a com mon sub jec tion to the same gov ern-
ing in sti tu tions, she firmly opts for a ”thicker” ver sion of the con cept, ac cord ing to 
uio.no/ikos/forskning/forskningsprosjekter/utvik/gulf/7.pdf (May 19, 2008)
1 Ali SHARIATI, Ommat va Emamat, p. 62 (place and date of publication not specified). Apud 
Yadullah SHAHIBZADEH, Kjetil SELVIK, ”Iran’s Political…cit”, p. 4.
2 Ibidem, p. 7.
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which mem bers of the po liti cal com mu nity are ”re lated by shar ing not only in sti-
tu tions, ter ri tory, state or na tional sym bols, a le gal sys tem, etc., but also val ues, po-
liti cal cul ture, na tional and po liti cal iden tity, a sense of al le giance, and so on”1. 
Echo ing Rawls – au thor of Po liti cal Lib er al ism (1993), rather than that of A The ory of 
Jus tice (1971) –, she stresses at one point that
”any thing less than a rea soned agree ment – grudg ing ac cep tance, for in stance, 
in dif fer ence or the ab sence of con vic tion – will mean that the pol ity is noth ing 
more than a mo dus vivendi, and that can not meet the needs for com mit ment 
and par tici pa tion that gen erat genu ine po liti cal sta bil ity”2.
Fra zer is aware, of course, that a com mu nity also in volves ar gu ments, even 
con flicts over the mean ing of the shared val ues and goals, or the way those val ues 
need to keep pace with time. How ever she be lieves that in a full-fledged po liti cal 
com mu nity ”what is shared will be priviledged for prac ti cal pur poses over dis-
agree ment and dif fer ences”3.
Priviledg ing agree ment on val ues and pur poses is rela tively easy in com mu-
ni ties which are not di vided along eth nic, lin guis tic, re li gious lines and do not be-
long to in com pati ble le gal tra di tions. In deeply di vided so cie ties how ever, the 
prac ti cal rea sons are of ten less then suf fi cient. With re spect to this chal lenge, Fra-
zer ad mits, build ing on Bene dict Ander son and David Miller, that in the cir cum-
stances of di ver sity ”po liti cal re la tions and state unity can only be achieved by the 
use of sym bols, and ritu als as sym bols, which re late each to each and to the whole 
on the imagi nary level”. More con cretely, ”state in sti tu tions must de ploy myths 
and as so ci ated sym bols of ’na tion hood’ in such a way that all citi zens ori ent to 
these in such a way as to un der stand them selves as re lated to their fel low citi zens 
and to the whole”4.
How ever, as Fra zer her self em pha sized, the mythi cal jus ti fi ca tion of the pre-
vail ing po liti cal or der is usu ally pro vided by self-in ter ested po liti cal el ites, who pre-
fer to de ploy the in stru ments of ex clu sion, rather then more in te gra tive ways of 
de fin ing the state and the po liti cal com mu nity, defi ni tions in which the dif fer ent 
seg ments of the so ci ety re late each to each and to the whole on the imagi nary level. 
In ad di tion to this in ter nal con tra dic tion, Fra zer’s ac count bears a sec ond one: 
when an chor ing her in ter pre ta tion of the ideal po liti cal com mu nity in the sphere of 
com mu ni tarian po liti cal the ory, she is obliged to as sume the con se quences of what 
she sees to be one of the dis tinc tive fea ture of po liti cal com mu ni tari an ism:
”Com mu ni tarians ar gue that the con duct of po liti cal life must be con-
gru ent with the con duct of com mu nity life. That is, the cul ture in her ing in 
po liti cal in sti tu tions of the state and the lo cal ity, must fit with the cul tural life 
peo ple live in their com mu ni ties – their lo cal area of resi dence, their schools 
and work places and churches”5.
Two con se quences fol low from here, equally prob lem atic for con tem po rary oli-
ti cal the ory: (1) the po liti cal com mu nity is jus ti fied to seek ho mo ge ne ity in order to 
1 Elizabeth FRAZER, The Problems of…cit, p. 241.
2 Ibidem, pp. 224-225.
3 Ibidem, p. 239.
4 Ibidem, p. 242.
5 Ibidem, p. 238.
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se cure the con gru ence be tween poli tics and cul ture; (2) when the con duct of com-
mu nity life at the level of the state dif fers from the one in cer tain lo cal ar eas of resi-
dence than the lat ter are en ti tled to seek con gru ence be tween poli tics and cul ture 
by claim ing the status of sepa rate po liti cal com mu nity.
The sa li ence of com mu ni tari an ism in po liti cal thought on the na ture and func-
tions of po liti cal com mu nity, as well as the ex clu sion ary and ho moge niz ing con se-
quences of the domi nant in ter pre ta tions of the term have been ac knowl edged by 
An drew Linklater, too, who ex plores the is sue from the per spec tive of the the ory of 
in ter na tional re la tions1. Build ing on Hegel, he em pha sizes the im por tance of the 
com mu ni ties’ fun da men tal right to pro tect ”their dif fer ent ways of life”, a right 
which stems from the ”im por tance which hu man be ings at tach to their mem ber-
ship in spe cific bounded com mu ni ties”. By ex er cis ing this right, through self-de-
ter mi na tion and the prin ci ple of sov er eignty, com mu ni ties cre ate the ap pro pri ate 
frame works of free dom, in ac cor dance ”with the unique ex peri ence and dis tinc-
tive tra di tion of dif fer ent forms of life”2.
Self-de ter mi na tion and the prin ci ple of sov er eignty, how ever, of ten gen er ate 
vari ous forms of ex clu sion. Sov er eignty, warns Linklater, ”is ex clu sion ary be cause 
it frus trates the po liti cal as pi ra tions of sub or di nate cul tures”3. It also in volves the 
right to clo sure: com mu nal self-de ter mi na tion, the right of a com mu nity to de ter-
mine its own af fairs can not be con sid ered com plete, if it does not in clude the right 
to de cide who can and who can not en ter the com mu nity. In or der to pre serve its 
auton omy and dis tinct ive ness, the po liti cal com mu nity is forced to harden bounda-
ries which sepa rate in sid ers from out sid ers. The hege monic po liti cal dis courses, 
which ”set the rules of the game” in Fra zer’s terms, are im por tant in stru ments of 
the clo sure since they are meant to
”…chan nel hu man loy al ties away from po ten tially com pet ing sites of power 
to cen tral iz ing and mo nopo liz ing sov er eign states which en deav oured to 
make na tional bounda ries as mor ally un prob lem atic, as pos si ble”4.
What re sulted from the prac ti cal need of po liti cal com mu ni ties to pro tect 
their dis tinct ive ness and par ticu lar way of or ga niz ing so cial life was a proc ess 
through which ”more in clu sive and less ex pan sive forms of po liti cal as so cia tion 
failed in the strug gle for sur vival”5. The form of po liti cal com mu nity which pre-
vailed as the re sult of this evo lu tion is one which is ”too puffed up and too com-
pressed” at the same time:
”…too puffed up, or uni ver sal is tic, be cause the needs of those who do not 
ex hibit the domi nant cul tural char ac ter is tics have fre quently been dis re-
garded; too com pressed, or par ticu lar is tic be cause the in ter ests of the out sid-
ers have typi cally been ig nored”6.
It is not dif fi cult to dis cover in Linklater’s ac count the same ten sion which has 
been iden ti fied by Fra zer be tween the ”thin” and ”thick” ver sions of the idea of 
1 Andrew LINKLATER, The Transformation of…cit.
2 Ibidem, pp. 49-53.
3 Ibidem, p. 61.
4 Ibidem, p. 29.
5 Ibidem, p. 28.
6 Ibidem, p. 193.
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politi cal com mu nity. As Linklater ob serves, a ma jor di lemma for com mu ni tarian 
po liti cal thought origi nates from this ten sion: the chal lenge to think of the sov er-
eign state as the only al ter na tive to the cos mo poli tan ar gu ment for enlarg ing the 
moral fron tiers to in clude the whole hu man kind, on the one hand, and to take is-
sue with the sov er eign state which de prives lo cal com mu ni ties of the right to 
self-de ter mi na tionand, on the other.
Linklater be lieves that po liti cal com mu ni ties ac cepted by the in ter na tional le-
gal or der are far less ”fin ished and com plete” than neo-re al ism has de picted them. 
Many states are ”in com plete”, po liti cal com mu ni ties are of ten ”pre cari ous”, and 
what is needed in the cur rent phase is ex plor ing new forms of po liti cal com mu-
nity, to gether with a ”more com pre hen sive un der stand ing of what it means to be 
a full mem ber of a po liti cal com mu nity”1.
The short com ings of the domi nant con cep tion of mod ern po liti cal com mu nity 
– in which sov er eignty, ter ri to ri al ity, citi zen ship and one domi nant eth nocul tural 
com mu nity are wed ded to gether, im pov er ish ing, as Linklater puts it, West ern po-
liti cal imagi na tion – can be over come in his view through a tri ple trans for ma tion of 
the idea of po liti cal com mu nity: by greater re spect se cured for cul tural dif fer ences 
(1); stronger com mit ment for the re duc tion of in ter nal ine quali ties (2); sig nifi cant 
ad vance ments in uni ver sal ity (3)2. Pro gress in these three di rec tions would have, 
ac cord ing to Linklater, the im pact of ”deep en ing and wid en ing” the sense of the 
con cept3, as well as of fer ing a so lu tion to the prob lem of those groups which ”do 
not feel at home in the po liti cal com mu nity”4. In ad di tion to nar row ing the dis-
tance be tween the ”thin” and ”thick” in ter pre ta tions of the term, the sug gested tri-
ple trans for ma tion has also the po ten tial to bridge the gap be tween com mu ni tarian 
and cos mo poli tan po liti cal thought on the na ture of po liti cal com mu nity:
”Far from be ing an ti theti cal, com mu ni tari an ism and cos mopol itan ism 
pro vide com ple men tary in sights into the pos si bil ity of new forms of com mu-
nity and citi zen ship in the post-West phalian era. They re veal that more com-
plex as so cia tions of uni ver sal ity and dif fer ence can be de vel oped by break ing 
the nexus be tween sov er eignty, ter ri to ri al ity, na tion al ity and citi zen ship and 
by pro mot ing wider com mu ni ties of dis course”5.
Linklater’s ac count, which is criti cal and vi sion ary at the same time, will proba-
bly not rep re sent the last word in po liti cal the ory on the pre vail ing na ture and pre-
dict able fu ture of the po liti cal com mu nity. By link ing the is sue of po liti cal 
com mu ni ties to the ques tion of self-de ter mi na tion, he sheds light, how ever, to the 
criti cal as pect of the con di tions in which a po liti cal com mu nity is con sti tuted. 
When com mu ni ties take pos ses sion – in po liti cal sense – of them selves, by step ping 
on the road of self-de ter mi na tion, they of ten take pos ses sion of other, sub or di nated 
groups as well, who do not share the agree ment on the jus ti fied na ture of the emerg-
ing po liti cal unit. If the way in which a po liti cal com mu nity had been con sti tuted is 
1 Ibidem, p. 187.
2 With regard to the de-territorialization of the political community see also David 
CHANDLER, ”The Possibilities of Post-territorial Political Community”, Area, vol. 39, no.1, 
March 2007, pp. 116-119.
3 Ibidem, p. 60.
4 Ibidem, p. 187.
5 Ibidem, p. 60.
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an is sue and re mains con tested for a long pe riod of time, de moc ratic pro ce dural ism 
regu larly can not of fer a so lu tion1: the sub or di nated groups will be ex cluded from 
the com mu nity of dis course, or if not, their voices will re main un heard.
Iden tity Struc tures and Eth nopoli ti cal Op tions
in the Ro ma nian Pub lic Opin ion
I will pre sent in what fol lows the pre vail ing iden tity struc tures and eth nopoli-
ti cal strate gies as re flected in pub lic opin ion polls and re searches con ducted in the 
past years2.
As far as the domi nant iden tity struc tures of Ro ma ni ans and Hun gari ans are 
con cerned, im por tant simi lari ties and dif fer ences were ob served by Raluca Sore-
anu, who in ves ti gated the da ta bases of a se ries of sur veys con ducted be tween 
2000 and 20023, on sam ples rep re sen ta tive for the popu la tion of Ro ma nia. The 
polls used ques tion naires fairly simi lar so as to al low com pari son and draw ing 
con clu sion con cern ing the evo lu tion of the in ves ti gated in di ca tors4.
Ana lyz ing the dis tri bu tion of an swers re corded with re gard to the ques tion: 
”Ac cord ing to your opin ion, which are the three most im por tant cir cum stances on the ba-
sis of which some body can be con sid ered Ro ma nian/Hun gar ian?” Sore anu com piled the 
ta ble re pro duced in An nex 1 (the per cent ages rep re sent the sum of the first, sec ond 
and third op tions).
It is in ter est ing to note that while the way in which Ro ma ni ans de fine both the 
in-group and the out-group is quite simi lar with the Hun gari ans’ views on the fun da-
men tals of ”Ro ma nian ness”, the auto-iden ti fi ca tion of the Hun gari ans in Ro ma nia 
is sig nifi cantly dif fer ent, lay ing em pha sis on mother-tongue and feel ings, in stead 
of place of birth and citi zen ship. The most im por tant con clu sion of Sore anu’s analy-
sis is how ever the fact that ac cord ing to the way in which Ro ma ni ans pre domi-
nantly de fine ”Hun garian ness”, Hun gari ans in Tran syl va nia do not qual ify in this 
cate gory, since they are not born in Hun gary and are not Hun gar ian citi zens.
Based on these find ings, Sore anu con sid ers that the re la tion ship be tween the 
three iden ti ties – Ro ma nian, Hun gar ian and Hun gar ian in Ro ma nia – can be rep re-
sented graphi cally as re pro duced in An nex 2.
1 ”We cannot solve the problem of the proper scope and domain of democratic units from 
within democratic theory. Like the majority principle, the democratic process presupposes a 
proper unit. The criteria of the democratic process presuppose the rightfulness of the unit itself. If the unit 
is not proper or rightful – if its scope and domain is not justifiable – then it cannot be made right-
ful simply by democratic procedures.” Robert A. DAHL, Democracy and Its Critics, Yale University 
Press, New Haven–London, 1989, p. 207. Italics in the original.
2 This part of the paper is an ammended version of a similar chapter from Levente SALAT, 
”Prevailing Identity Structures and Competing Ethnopolitical Strategies in Transylvania”, 
Hungarian Studies, vol. 21, no. 1, 2007, pp. 19-60. 
3 Ethnobarometer – Interethnic Relations in Romania, Research Center for Interethnic Relations, 
Cluj, May-June 2000; Barometer of Ethnic Relations, Ethnocultural Diversity Resource Center, Cluj, 
November 2001; Barometer of Ethnic Relations, Ethnocultural Diversity Resource Center, Cluj, 
October 2002. 
4 Raluca SOREANU, ”Autodefinire şi heterodefinire a românilor şi maghiarilor din România. 
O analiză empirică a stereotipurilor etnice şi a fundamentelor diferite de definire a identităţii etni-
ce”, in Gabriel BĂDESCU, Mircea KIVU, Monica ROBOTIN (eds.), Barometrul Relaţiilor Etnice 
1994-2002. O perspectivă asupra climatului interetnic din România, CRDE, Cluj, 2005, pp. 65-88. 
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Ro ma ni ans ac cept Tran syl va nian Hun gari ans in the civic in-group pro vided 
that they do not con sider them selves Hun gari ans (which equals with the fact that 
they see them as Ro ma ni ans). Since this is not the case – Tran syl va nian Hun gari-
ans strongly con sider that they be long to the cul tur ally de fined Hun gar ian na-
tion –, the con cept of the ”Ro ma nian civic na tion” is void in the sense that it falls 
back to the eth nic con cept of the na tion – ac cord ing to the way in which the Ro ma-
nian Con sti tu tion de fines it.
In ter pret ing the find ings of the same re search, Irina Cu lic ob serves that while 
the self-defi ni tion of Ro ma ni ans is a ”mixed ter ri to rial-cul tural con struct”, the 
self-defi ni tion of Hun gari ans in Tran syl va nia is ”par ex cel lence cul tural”1. This dif-
fer ence in self-per cep tion leads in her view to the fol low ing pat terns of ex clu sion:
”The Ro ma ni ans ’en joy’ their na tion, while the Hun gari ans are ex-
cluded from it. Or, to con cieve the situa tion from an other point of view, the 
Hun gari ans ex clude them selves from it, by en ter ing the ’club’ of the Hun gar-
ian na tion, and en joy ing its goods and ser vices”2.
Simi lar re sults were re corded by a sur vey con ducted in 1997 as part of a 
broader com para tive re search fo cus ing on the Car pa thian Ba sin, ini ti ated by the 
Eöt vös Lóránd Uni ver sity of Bu da pest, un der a UNESCO pro gram on na tional mi-
nori ties. The com po nent of the re search fo cus ing on Ro ma nian iden ti fied sig nifi-
cant dif fer ences in the domi nant iden tity struc tures of Ro ma ni ans and Hun gari ans 
in Ro ma nia. While 75% of the Ro ma nian re spon dents’ opin ions re flected to tal or 
par tial agree ment with the state ment that for some body to be con sid ered Ro ma-
nian it is nec es sary to be born in Ro ma nia, in the case of the Hun gari ans only 9% 
of the re spon dents agreed to tally or par tially with the cor re spond ing state ment: 
for some body to be con sid ered Hun gar ian is nec es sary to be born in Hun gary. If 
the ques tion re ferred to the re la tion ship be tween citi zen ship and iden tity, 78% of 
the Ro ma nian re spon dents agreed to tally or par tially with the state ment ac cord-
ing to which for some body to be con sid ered Ro ma nian it is nec es sary to have Ro-
ma nian citi zen ship, while only 18% of the Hun gar ian re spon dents took a simi lar 
stand with re gard to the cor re spond ing ques tion re fer ring to the re la tion ship be-
tween Hun gar ian iden tity and Hun gar ian citi zen ship3.
Based on the data of the Car pa thian Ba sin re search, Irina Cu lic ob serves the 
fol low ing:
”The di lemma of the mi nor i tarian is an im por tant source of ten sion. 
First, for the mem ber of the mi nor ity com mu nity who has to choose of ten 
be tween the two iden ti ties, civic and na tional (eth nic). In many cases, with-
out re gard to the al ter na tive which de fines, in a given cir cum stance, the per-
son’s ac tions, at ti tudes and op tions, the re sult seems to be that of a zero, or 
even nega tive sum game. In most of the cases in which eth nic ity (iden tity) mat-
ters, the two al ter na tives can not be rec on ciled. Sec ond, the du al ity of the mi nor-
i tari ans’ iden tity is a sourse of ten sion for the mem bers of the ma jori tarian 
1 Irina CULIC, ”Nationhood and Identity: Romanians and Hungarians in Transylvania”, in 
Balázs TRANCSÉNYI, Dragoş PETRESCU et al (eds.), Nation-Building and Contested Identities: 
Romanian and Hungarian Case Studies, Regio Books-Polirom, Budapest-Iaşi, 2001, p. 237.
2 Ibidem, p. 241.
3 Irina CULIC, ”Dilema minoritarului: între identitate civilă şi identitate naţională”, in Irina 
CULIC, István HORVÁTH, Cristian STAN (eds.), Reflecţii asupra diferenţei, Editura Limes, Cluj, 
1999, p. 43.
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na tion, too. The am biva lence of the mi nor i tarian gen er ates mis trust, un cer-
tainty, sus pi cion. The ma jori tarian ex pects a kind of loy alty which is un at tain-
able for the mi nor i tarian”1.
Cu lic be lieves that the situa tion could be pos si bly changed by pro vid ing 
more sub stan tive rights to the Hun gar ian mi nor ity. She is aware, how ever, that 
even if the loy alty of the Hun gar ian mi nor ity to wards the Ro ma nian state could 
proba bly be en hanced in this way, the re ac tions of the Ro ma nian ma jor ity is more 
dif fi cult to fore see:
”A dif fer ent type po liti cal and civic for mal iza tion of the mi nor ity’s situa-
tion (maxi mal edu ca tional rights in the lan guage of the mi nor ity, cul tural and 
ter ri to rial self-gov ern ment, or other forms of civic and po liti cal or gani za tion) 
might proba bly change the sub stance of the mi nor ity’s iden tity con struc tion, 
though it is de bat able how such a change could come about, as well as the 
way in which the ma jor ity would re late to the mi nor ity in this situa tion”2.
Other vari ables of the al ready men tioned sur veys con ducted in 2001-2002 
seem to of fer sev eral re sponses to the above ques tion posed by Cu lic. As far as the 
domi nant views re gard ing the most im por tant etho poli ti cal op tions of Tran syl va-
nian Hun gari ans – auton omy, edu ca tion in mother-tongue, Hun gar ian lan guage 
state uni ver sity, state sub si dies for the Hun gar ian cul ture, dou ble citi zen ship, as-
sis tance of fered by the Hun gar ian state – are con cerned, the situa tion, as re flected 
in the sur veys, is pre sented in An nex 33.
It is evi dent from the data that while the enlisted ob jec tives are sup ported by 
the large ma jor ity of the Hun gar ian re spon dents, the re sis tance of the Ro ma nian 
popu la tion is con sid er able, es pe cially as far as the is sue of auton omy is con cerned.
Re gard ing the way in which the topic of Hun gary’s in volve ment is con cerned, 
the opin ions are dis trib uted ac cord ing to the dia gram re pro duced in An nex 4.
The ten den cies re flected in the above are be ing con firmed by sub se quent polls, 
too. A sur vey con ducted in 20034 re corded, for in stance, the dis tri bu tion of opin-
ions about Hun gari ans in Ro ma nia as pre sented in An nex 5 (the dis tri bu tion does 
not in clude the opin ions of those re spon dents who de clared to be Hun gari ans).
In De cem ber 2006 a new na tion ally rep re sen ta tive sur vey was re al ized and a 
re search re port com piled which com pares the re corded re sults with the ones reg is-
tered in the al ready men tioned 2002 poll5. As far as the opin ions re gard ing the role 
and in volve ment of the Hun gar ian state are con cerned, the situa tion evolved as il-
lus trated in An nex 6.
Con cern ing the re la tion ships be tween the Ro ma nian state and the Hun gar ian 
mi nor ity, meas ured with the level of ac cep tance by the Ro ma nian pub lic opin ion 
of the Hun gari ans’ eth nopoli ti cal op tions, the evo lu tion is re flected by the ta ble re-
pro duced in An nex 7.
1 Ibidem, p. 46.
2 Ibidem.
3 Ioana PAUL, Mirela TUDORAN, Luiza CHILARIU, ”Români şi maghiari. Reprezentări 
in-grup, out-grup în cazul grupurilor etnice din România”, in Gabriel BĂDESCU, Mircea KIVU, 
Monica ROBOTIN (eds.), Barometrul Relaţiilor Etnice...cit, pp. 89-117.
4 Intoleranţă, discriminare şi autoritarism în opinia publică, Institutul pentru Politici Publice-Gallup, 
Bucureşti, septembrie 2003.
5 Climat interetnic în România în pragul integrării europene, Guvernul României. Departamentul 
pentru Relaţii Interetnice, Bucureşti, 4 decembrie 2006. 
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The re port com pares the evo lu tion of the opin ions re gard ing the qual ity of 
the Ro ma nian-Hun gar ian re la tions, too. In this re spect the situa tion evolved as 
pre sented in An nex 8.
The slightly di min ished level of ac cep tance of the in volve ment of the Hun gar-
ian state and the de crease of the sup port for the eth nopoli ti cal ob jec tives of the 
Hun gar ian mi nor ity, to gether with the quite sig nifi cant in crease in the share of the 
re spon dents who see the Ro ma nian-Hun gar ian re la tions more loaded with con-
flict is ex plained in the re port by the re in force ment of eth no cen trism, due to the in-
creased visi bil ity of the Hun gar ian lan guage in the pub lic spaces (in ac cor dance 
with the pro vi sions of the pub lic ad mini stra tion law adopted in 2001) and the re-
newed pub lic de bate around the auton omy claims of the Hun gar ian po liti cal elite 
in Tran syl va nia1. It is in ter est ing to note that those re spon dents who ap pre ci ate 
the re la tions as be ing based on col labo ra tion (30.8%) see as one of the ma jor ad van-
tages of Ro ma nia’s EU ac ces sion the le gal frame work of the EU which will curb 
the auton omy claims of the Hun gari ans’ po liti cal or gani za tion (DAHR). The same 
re spon dents con sider that the idea of auton omy is sub ver sive and equals with a 
po liti cal at tack against the et nopoli ti cal status-quo2.
The Hun gar ian analy sis of the data re corded in Tran syl va nia dur ing the 1997 
Car pa thian Ba sin re search iden ti fied dif fer ent types of cleav ages in the Hun gar ian 
and the Ro ma nian popu la tion in Tran syl va nia3. Ac cord ing to Cse peli, Örkény and 
Széke lyi, Hun gari ans in Tran syl va nia can be cate go rized in four clus ters by the 
fear-hope and the na tion al ist-as simi la tion ist axes. Close to 60% of the Hun gar ian 
popu la tion be long to the cate gory of the ”wor ried”, which in cludes per sons who 
do not situ ate them selves at large dis tance from Ro ma ni ans, but their net works do 
not in clude mem bers of the ma jor ity, and they per ceive a high level of con flict gen-
er ated by all ac tors in volved. A sec ond cate gory, the ”mod er ate op ti mists”, com-
pris ing 20% of the Hun gar ian popu la tion in Tran syl va nia, in cludes per sons who 
situ ate them selves at a lar ger dis tance from the ma jor ity, but they con sider that all 
ac tors are in ter ested in re duc ing the ten sions. An other 10% of the Hun gari ans are 
la beled as ”na tion al ists” by the analy sis: the per sons in cluded in this clus ter situ-
ate them selves at large dis tance from the Ro ma ni ans, they re la tion net works do 
not in clude mem bers of the ma jor ity and they con sider that the ten sions are in ten-
si fied by the Ro ma ni ans and miti gated by Hun gari ans and the in ter na tional or-
gani za tions. The re main ing 10% con sti tute the clus ter of the ”in te grated”. The 
per sons be long ing to this cate gory have an ex tended net work of re la tions with Ro-
ma ni ans, do not feel any so cial dis tance from the ma jor ity, and con sider that the 
ten sions are gen er ated by Hun gari ans and the in ter na tional or gani za tions.
As far as the domi nant pat terns of think ing about the Ro ma nian-Hun gar ian 
re la tion ships in the case of Ro ma ni ans in Tran syl va nia are con cerned, Cse peli, 
Örkény and Széke lyi iden ti fied three clus ters. The first cate gory is la beled as the 
”dis tance-keep ers”, com pris ing 47% of the Ro ma nian popu la tion. The per sons be-
long ing to this clus ter do not de fine a large so cial dis tance from Hun gari ans, but 
they have no Hun gar ian net works at all, and they blame mainly the Ro ma ni ans 
and the in ter na tional or gani za tions for keep ing the ten sions high. The sec ond clus-
ter in cludes the ”na tion al ists”, who sense a large so cial dis tance from Hun gari ans, 
1 Ibidem, p. 11.
2 Ibidem.
3 György CSEPELI, Antal ÖRKÉNY, Mária SZÉKELYI, Nemzetek egymás tükrében, Balassi 
Kiadó, Budapest, 2002, pp. 40-42.
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their net works do not in clude mem bers of the mi nor ity and they con sider that the 
ten sions are gen er ated by Hun gari ans, while Ro ma ni ans and the in ter na tional or-
gani za tions try to al le vi ate the con flict. This clus ter com prises 46% of the Ro ma-
nian popu la tion in Tran syl va nia. The last cate gory, con sist ing in 7% of the 
Ro ma ni ans, is la beled as the ”ac com mo da tors”, who do not feel large so cial dis-
tance, their net works in clude many Hun gari ans and they be lieve that Hun gari ans 
miti gate, Ro ma ni ans in ten sify, and in ter na tional or gani za tions me di ate the con-
flict. For a more il lus tra tive com pari son of the domi nant re la tional pat terns as re-
flected in the 1997 Car pa thian Ba sin re search see An nex 9.
The re search re port of the poll ing in sti tute that con ducted the 2006 sur vey 
con tains fur ther in ter est ing data about the level of ac cep tance of the Hun gar ian 
lan guage in pub lic spaces, and on the way in which the role and ac tiv ity of the 
Hun gari ans’ eth nic party (DAHR) is ap pre ci ated1.
As far as the opin ions re gard ing the im ple mented lan guage rights are con-
cerned, the situa tion reg is tered by the 2006 poll is re flected in the chart re pro-
duced in An nex 10.
The re port in cludes an in ter est ing com pari son of the way in which the opin-
ions con cern ing the role and im pact of the DAHR were re flected in the 2000, 2002 
and 2006 polls. The per cent ages in the chart re pro duced by An nex 11 re flect the 
opin ion of the Ro ma nian re spon dents only.
The pre domi nance, in 2006, of the Ro ma nian re spon dent’s nega tive opin ion 
with re gard to the im pact of the DAHR’s ac tiv ity is re flected by the set of data re-
pro duced in An nex 12, too.
Fur ther in ter est ing as pects are of fered by two re searches with fo cus on 
younger gen era tions. A re search con ducted in 2004 which in cluded quan ti ta tive 
and quali ta tive com po nents, too, re vealed that the in tol er ance iden ti fi able at the 
level of younger gen era tions (aged be tween 15 and 35) is due mainly to dif fi cul ties 
of com mu ni ca tion with Hun gari ans, who pre fer to speak in their lan guage even in 
the pres ence of Ro ma ni ans. Younger gen era tions of Ro ma ni ans con sider that the 
Hun gar ian mi nor ity has too many rights (rep re sen ta tion in Par lia ment, and they 
”as pire even to lead ing po si tions within the Ro ma nian state”) and that the ob jec-
tive of the Hun gar ian com mu nity is ”to im pose a sys tem in their own lan guage, 
and they want to gov ern them selves”2.
An other quali ta tive re search con ducted in 2006 on the domi nant val ues of Ro-
ma ni ans aged be tween 15 and 25 con firms these find ings. The par tici pants in the 
fo cus-groups gen er ally con sider that the Hun gari ans in Ro ma nia have too many 
rights (in some in stances: more than the Ro ma ni ans), they are dis turbed by the 
fact that Hun gar ian lan guage is spo ken in pub lic and they firmly re fuse the idea of 
auton omy. Some con sider that the Hun gari ans are ”ag gres sive” and ”they do not 
like the Ro ma ni ans”. More than half of the par tici pants would not ac cept a Hun-
gar ian in the fam ily and one third re fuse to have Hun gar ian friends. The re port 
men tions mi nor re gional dif fer ences and con sid ers that the mem bers of the 20-25 
years age group are slightly more in tol er ant3. These two re searches prove that the 
1 István HORVÁTH, Relaţii interetnice în pragul integrării europene. Câteva tendinţe comentate 
(Research Report), Max Weber Institute, Cluj, 2006. 
2 Tânăr în România. Raport de cercetare cantitaivă şi calitativă, British Council-Gallup, Bucureşti, 
2004, p. 9.
3 O perspectivă asupra valorilor tinerilor din România, British Council-ORICUM, Bucureşti, 
2006, pp. 68-81.
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domi nant way of judg ing Hun gari ans and their re la tion ship with the Ro ma nian 
state have been re pro duced dur ing the last 17 years.
Though its per spec tive is sig nifi cantly dif fer ent, the over all im age emerg ing 
from the above is re in forced also by a com pre hen sive re search co or di nated by 
Rogers Brubaker, fo cus ing on the in ter eth nic re la tions of Cluj, con ducted be tween 
1995 and 20011. Though the pat terns of ”eve ry day eth nic ity” in ves ti gated by the 
field work are pre domi nantly peace ful and only oc ca sion ally loaded with ten-
sions, the price paid for the peace seems to be avoid ing sys tem ati cally any sub stan-
tive de bate con cern ing the un set tled is sues of Ro ma nian-Hun gar ian co ex is tence 
in Tran syl va nia: vari ous ”eve ry day cop ing strate gies” are de ployed both by Ro ma-
ni ans and Hun gari ans to avoid con fron ta tion over sen si tive is sues or to down play 
the im por tance of con tro ver sial as pects.
Con clu sions
Re turn ing now to our ques tion con cern ing the Ro ma nian po liti cal com mu-
nity, the in ves ti ga tions above en ti tle us to draw the fol low ing con clu sions. If we 
bare in mind, fol low ing Fra zer, the ”thin” in ter pre ta tion of the con cept, the Ro ma-
nian po liti cal com mu nity quali fies with out doubts. How ever, if we con sider the 
”thick” ver sion of its sig nifi cance, the en tirety of the Ro ma nian citi zens, which in-
cludes the mem bers of the Hun gar ian mi nor ity, falls short of the cri te ria of the 
ideal po liti cal com mu nity for sev eral rea sons.
Though ter ri tory and po liti cal in sti tu tions are com mon, and the proof of po-
liti cal par tici pa tion of mem bers of the Hun gar ian mi nor ity is un de ni able since 
1920, val ues, po liti cal cul ture, na tional and po liti cal iden tity, the sense of al le-
giance are, as the evi dence of the polls and re searches dem on strate, far from be ing 
shared by the large ma jor ity of Ro ma ni ans and Hun gari ans in Ro ma nia.
In the wider com mu nity of dis course, in stead of a defi ni tion of the state in 
which the Ro ma nian and Hun gar ian seg ments of the so ci ety re late each to each 
and to the whole, as the nor ma tive pro vi sions of the the ory would rec om mend, 
we see those pat terns and agents of ex clu sion which Fra zer and Linklater talk 
about, pro vid ing jus ti fi ca tion for the po liti cal or der ac cord ing to the ma jor ity’s in-
ter est. The Ro ma nian Con sti tu tion, adopted in 1991 over the op po si tion of the 
Hun gar ian com mu nity and amended in 2003 with out tak ing into ac count the Hun-
gari ans’ de sires, con tin ues to de fine the state as be ing based on the unity of the Ro-
ma nian peo ple, with ref er ence to the eth nic and cul tural sense of the term. The 
Con sti tu tions makes clear also – in ac cor dance with the po liti cal com mu ni ties’ fun-
da men tal right to pro tect their own way of life, ac knowl edged, as we have seen, by 
po liti cal the ory – that the Ro ma nian state serves the in ter ests of the eth ni cally de-
fined Ro ma nian peo ple, which is the ex clu sive bene fi ci ary of the state’s sov er eignty. 
Ac cord ing to spe cial pro vi sions (Art. 152), any fu ture changes con cern ing the of fi-
cial lan guage, forms of auton omy or fed er al ism are ex cluded, which means that 
the re ne go tia tion of the way in which the dif fer ent seg ments of the popu la tion re-
late to one-an other and to the whole is ex cluded by the Con sti tu tion.
1 Rogers BRUBAKER, Margit FEISCHMIDT, Jon FOX, Liana GRANCEA, Nationalist Politics 
and Everyday Ethnicity in a Transylvanian Town, Princeton University Press, Princeton-Oxford, 2006.
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There is a prob lem, too, whith the way in which the po liti cal com mu nity was 
con sti tuted. As a mat ter of fact, in Tran syl va nia one can talk about a tra di tion of 
mu tual ig no rance among the cul tural com mu ni ties: in 1848 when a na tional as-
sem bly in Cluj adopted the un con di tioned uni fi ca tion of Tran syl va nia with Hun-
gary, nei ther the Ger mans (Sax ons), nor the Ro ma ni ans agreed. In 1918, when a 
Ro ma nian na tional as sem bly in Alba Iulia de clared the un con di tioned uni fi ca tion 
of Tran syl va nia with the Ro ma nian King dom, the will of the Hun gar ian com mu-
nity was ig nored, while the rep re sen ta tives of the Ger man com mu nity ad hered to 
the de ci sion much later, sub se quent to long ne go tia tions with the rep re sen ta tives 
of the Ro ma nian com mu nity1.
The myths and sym bols as so ci ated with the Ro ma nian ”na tion hood” – the an-
them, the na tional day, na tional he roes cele brated in pub lic spaces – do not help 
Hun gari ans in Tran syl va nia to feel re lated to their fel low citi zens and to the whole 
of the po liti cal com mu nity ei ther: on the con trary, they are per ma nently warned 
by those sym bols that they are his tori cal ene mies of the Ro ma nian peo ple.
This is per haps one of the many rea sons for which Ro ma ni ans and Hun gari ans 
failed through out his tory to de velop those com mon po liti cal in sti tu tions which 
could re pro duce from gen era tion to gen era tion the in te ri or ized ”re cip ro cal 
re spect”, con sid ered by Do mi nique Schnap per so criti cal for a ”sta ble” na tion or 
po liti cal com mu nity.
The lack of po liti cal in sti tu tions based on mu tual trust and re spect, as well as 
its con se quences in the domi nant pa terns of re lat ing to the other, are evi dent in the 
re searches in ven to ried above. The data have also re flected nega tive trends in sev-
eral con cerns in 2006 as com pared to 2000 and 2002. What is shared seems not to 
be privi leged, for prac ti cal rea sons, over dis agree ment and dif fer ences, and, as a re-
sult, Hun gari ans in Ro ma nian evi dently do not ”feel at home” in the Ro ma nian po-
liti cal com mu nity. The ac cen tu ated in ter est in auton omy, which equals with the 
de sire to be long to a sepa rate po liti cal com mu nity within which the enlisted dis ad-
van tages can be com pen sated, seems to be – be yond its his tori cally rooted po liti-
cal jus ti fi ca tion claimed by the Hun gar ian po liti cal elite – a logi cal re ac tion on 
be half of the Hun gar ian mi nor ity in Tran syl va nia.
The case of the Ro ma nian po liti cal com mu nity is evi dently not sin gu lar. While 
the great ma jor ity of the po liti cal com mu ni ties ex ist ing to day can be con sid ered as 
such ac cord ing to the ”thin” in ter pre ta tion of the word, they of ten fall short if the 
”thick” in ter pre ta tion pro vides the cri te ria. More over, the domi nant el ites of the po liti-
cal com mu ni ties are guided usu ally by the ”thick” ver sion of the con cept when they 
think of them selves, while they regu larly rec om mend to the mi nor ity na tions to re late 
to the pre vail ing po liti cal or der ac cord ing to the ”thin” in ter pre ta tion of the term.
Build ing on Linklater, an in ter est ing ques tion fol lows from the above: to what 
ex tent can the Ro ma nian po liti cal com mu nity be con sid ered ”fin ished and com-
plete”? Are there still chances for more suc cess ful po liti cal pro jects, in Schnap per’s 
sense, of in te gra tion which could fos ter in the fu ture the ”deep en ing and wid en-
ing” of the Ro ma nian po liti cal com mu nity? Though both the Ro ma nian and Hun-
gar ian po liti cal elite seems for the time be ing un in ter ested in ad dress ing simi lar 
ques tions, the is sue might be brought on the agenda in the fore see able fu ture by 
ad vance ments in the Euro pean Un ion, the evo lu tion of the Roma ques tion or de-
vel op ments in the Ro ma nian-Mol da vian re la tion ships.
1 Cf: Károly KÓS, Erdély, Szépirodalmi Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 1988 (1934), pp. 85-86. 
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ANNEXES
An nex 1
Autodefi ni tion
Simi lari ties/
Dif fer ences
Het erode fini tion
ROMANIAN 
DEFINING:
the Ro ma nian 
(ac tive)
the Hun gar ian 
(pas sive)
To be born in Ro ma nia
63,7%
Sig nifi cant 
simi larity
To be born in Hungary
54,5%
To be Ro ma nian citi zen
36,8%
To be Hun garian citi zen
40,9%
Ro ma nian mother-tongue
41,9%
Hun garian 
mother-tongue
44,1%
To feel Ro ma nian
31,5%
To feel Hun garian
30,5%
Simi lari ties/
Dif fer ences
Sig nifi cant similarity Partial dif fer ences
HUNGARIAN 
DEFINING:
the Ro ma nian 
(pas sive)
the Hun gar ian 
(ac tive)
To be born in Ro ma nia
36,3%
Par tial 
dif fer ences
Hun garian 
mother-tongue
75,4%
To be Ro ma nian citi zen
32,2%
To feel Hun garian
51,9%
Ro ma nian mother-tongue
60%
Hun garian par ents
43,3%
Ro ma nian par ents
34,2% Baptized in a Hun-garian Church
35,5%To feel Ro ma nian34,5%
Het erodefi ni tion
Simi lari ties/
Dif fer ences
Autode fini tion 
Source: SOREANU, 2005
An nex 2
            Ro ma nian citi zens = citi zens’ in-group
Civic iden tity
Eth nic Ro ma-
nian Ma jor ity
Eth nic Hun gar ian 
Mi nor ity
 Eth nic in-groupEth nic out-group
The culturally defined 
Hungarian nation
Eth nic iden tity =
eth nic in-group 
in broad sense  
 
Source: SOREANU, 2005
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An nex 3
To what extent do you agree that...
46%
50%
13%
39%
41%
96%
94%
85%
82%
86%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100
%
the Romanian state should provide Hungarian
children in Romania with education in Hungarian
the Romanian state should support cultural
organizations of Hungarians in Romania
the counties in which Hungarians are in majority
should have more autonomy
the Hungarians in Romania should have double,
Romanian and Hungarian citizenship
the Hungarian state should provide ethnic Hungarians
in Romania with certain rights
Hungarians
Romanians
Source: PAUL, TUDORAN, CHILARIU, 2005
An nex 4
To what extent do you agree with the following statements concerning Hungary?
62%
47%
41%
41%
96%
49%
76%
17%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100
%
It is normal that the Hungarian Government is
interested in the situation of Transylvanian
Hungarians
Hungary wil never give up its claims over
Transylvania
The EU integration of Hungary is a good thing for
Romania
The Hungarian investments in Transylvania have
political objectives
Hungarians
Romanians
Source: PAUL, TUDORAN, CHILARIU, 2005
To what extent do you agree with the following statements concerning Hungary?
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An nex 5
To what extent do you agree with the following statements?
59
53
37
24
14
24
5
22
23
20
33
12
21
5
6
5
9
14
30
21
23
4
3
7
8
33
25
55
9
16
27
21
11
9
12
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100
%
Hungarians should use only Romanaian language in
public admnistration
Hungarians will never give up  their claims over
Transy lvania
Hungarians should rather leave to Hungary
The counties were Hungarians are in majority should
have moer autonomy
total agreement partial agreement partial disagreement total disagreement DK/NA
Source: IPP–Gallup, 2003
An nex 6
”In your opin ion is it ac cept able that the Hun gar ian state…”
Agree ment [%] Dis agree ment [%]
2002 2006 2002 2006
encour ages the Hun garian 
language educa tion in Romania? 37.8 26 59 55
provides Hun garians in Ro mania 
with Hun garian language 
text books? 
42.9 34 54 30
supports the Hun garian 
compa nies which invest 
in Romania?
64.1 57.3 31 45
strengthens its relations with po-
litical organi zations of the 
Hun garians in Ro mania?
42.4 39 51 52
offers Hun garian citizen ship to 
the Hun garians in Ro mania? 46 34 48 55
Source: Gu ver nul României, 2006
The counties were Hungarians a e in 
majority should have more autonomy
Hungarians should rather leave to Hungar
Hungaria s will never give u eir claims 
over Transylvania
Hunga n  should use only Roma ian 
language in public administration
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An nex 7
Agree ment [%] Dis agree ment [%]
2002 2006 2002 2006
The Roma nian state should 
provide educa tion in Hun garian 
language for the Hun garian 
children.
47.2 46.2 50.2 47.4
The Roma nian state should 
support cultural organi zations 
of Hun garians in Ro mania.
55.6 51.1 41.5 39.4
The counties where Hun garians 
are in majority should have more 
auton omy.
18.6 13.8 77.8 75.5
It is good if Hun garians in 
Romania have double, Roma nian 
and Hun garian citizen ship.
44.1 40.1 50.6 49.2
Source: Gu ver nul României, 2006
An nex 8
 
From the alternatives given below which one describes best, 
according to your opinion, the Romanian-Hungarian relations?
24,1
17,5
39
18,6
17
25,4
30,8
26,2
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
I cannot appreciate/other
Indifference
Relations of cooperation
Conflictual relations
2002 2006
 
Source: Gu ver nul României, 2006
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An nex 9
Roma nians Hun garians
”Na tion alists”
- large social dis tance from 
Hungarians
- their net works do not in clude 
mem bers of the mi nority
- con sider that the ten sions are 
gener ated by Hun garians, while 
Roma nians and the inter national 
or gani zations allevi ate the conflict
46% ”Na tion alists”
- large dis tance from the Ro mani ans
- their net works do not in clude 
members of the ma jority
- con sider that the ten sions are 
intensified by the Ro mani ans and 
mitigated by Hun gari ans and the 
interna tional or gani za tions
10%
”Dis tance keep ers”
- no Hun garian net works at all
- they blame mainly the 
Roma nians and the inter na tional 
organizations for keep ing the 
tensions high 
47% ”Worried”
- their net works do not in clude 
members of the ma jority
- per ceive a high level of con flict 
generated by all actors in volved 
60%
”Ac com moda tors”
- do not feel large social dis tance
- their net works in clude many 
Hungarians
- be lieve that Hun garians 
mitigate, Roma nians inten sify, 
and international or gani zations 
medi ate the con flict
7% ”Moderate opti mists”
- large dis tance from the ma jority
- they con sider that all actors are 
inter ested in re duc ing the ten sions 
20%
”In te grated”
- an ex tended net work of re lations with 
Ro mani ans
- con sider that the ten sions are 
generated by Hun gari ans and the 
interna tional or gani za tions
10%
Source: Based on CSEPELI, ÖRKÉNY, SZÉKELYI, 2002
An nex 10
 
In localities where many Hungarians live, public inscriptions should be 
also in Hungarian on...
30
32,6
32,3
32,7
40
35,4
26,9
38,6
25,4
27,3
26,4
24,3
37,2
46,9
37,3
35,2
28,8
32,1
5,9
4,7
4,6
4,8
4,8
8,3
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
shops
the cultural buildings
police
post office
Hungarian language schools
street-signs and road indicators
supportive indifferent opposing DK/NA
Source: HORVÁTH, 2006
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An nex 11
 
From the statements below which is the one you agree with?
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
DK/NA
DAHR should be banned.
DAHR should leave politics and be ransformed
into a cultural organization
DAHR can be represented in the Parliament
but should not be invited in the government.
DAHR can participate  in the government as
any other party.
Regardless which party wins the e lections,
DAHR should be invited in the government.
2006
2002
2000
Source: Based on HORVÁTH, 2006
An nex 12
 
To what extent do you agree...?
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
DAHR’s participation in the government is
necessary in order to provide good relations
among all ethnic groups in Romania.
Through its activity, DAHR promotes the
rights of all minorities in Romania.
DAHR’s participation in the government
resulted in the deterioration of the Romanian-
Hungarian relationships.
DAHR’s participation in the government
resulted in more rights of the Hungarian
minority than the rest of the population.
DAHR’s participation in the government does
not make any difference.
DAHR serves the interests of the Hungarian
minority only, not of the whole population.
Rather
agree 
Rather
disagree
Source: Based on HORVÁTH, 2006
.
